

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 SALT T 00220 01 OF 02 091613Z

41

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00

ACDE-00 /026 W

----- 112858

P R 091522Z JUL 75

FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2624

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USMISSION NATO

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 0220

EXDIS/SALT

DEPT ALSO PASS DOD

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PARM

SUBJ: AMBASSADOR JOHNSON'S STATEMENT OF JULY 9, 1975

(SALT TWO-665)

THE FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT DELIVERED BY AMBASSADOR JOHNSON
AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF JULY 9, 1975.

QUOTE

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR JOHNSON
JULY 9, 1975

MR. MINISTER:

I

AS I INDICATED IN MY LAST STATEMENT, I WILL TODAY DISCUSS IN
MORE DETAIL THE PROBLEMS FACED BY BOTH SIDES IN ACHIEVING ADEQUATE
VERIFICATION OF THE NEW AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, BEFORE TURNING

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 SALT T 00220 01 OF 02 091613Z

TO THE SUBJECT OF VERIFICATION, I WANT TO DISCUSS BRIEFLY THE

NEED FOR A HEAVY MISSILE DEFINITION AND LIMITATION IN THE
NEW AGREEMENT.

II

THE MARKED INCREASE IN DESTRUCTIVE POTENTIAL OF THE NEW SOVIET
MISSILE SYSTEMS HAS REINFORCED OUR VIEW THAT WE MUST RESOLVE
THIS ISSUE. THUS, FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE NEW AGREEMENT, WE
BELIEVE A HEAVY ICBM SHOULD BE DEFINED AS ANY ICBM WHICH
HAS A VOLUME OR THROW-WEIGHT GREATER THAN THAT OF THE LARGEST
NON-HEAVY ICBM DEPLOYED BY EITHER SIDE PRIOR TO THE DATE OF
SIGNATURE OF THE NEW AGREEMENT.

THE PURPOSE OF THIS HEAVY ICBM DEFINITION IS TO ASSURE THAT
THERE IS NO FURTHER EROSION IN THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN HEAVY AND
NON-HEAVY ICBMS. THIS EROSION, IF CONTINUED, WOULD VITIATE
ARTICLE II OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT. IN ADDITION, SUCH A
RESULT WOULD BE CONTRARY TO THE VLADIVOSTOK UNDERSTANDING TO
LIMIT HEAVY ICBMS BY CARRYING OVER PORTIONS OF THE INTERIM
AGREEMENT TO THE NEW AGREEMENT. MOREOVER, IT WOULD PERMIT
FURTHER INCREASES IN THE DESTRUCTIVE POTENTIAL OF ICBM FORCES,
INCREASES WHICH CAN IN TURN RESULT IN AN ADVERSE IMPACT ON THE
STABILITY OF THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES.

WE ALSO BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT THAT A CEILING BE PLACED ON
THE DESTRUCTIVE POTENTIAL OF HEAVY ICBMS. SUCH A CEILING IS
PROVIDED BY PARAGRAPH 5 OF ARTICLE IV OF THE JOINT DRAFT TEXT
WHICH LIMITS THE VOLUME AND THROW-WEIGHT OF HEAVY ICBMS TO THAT
OF THE LARGEST HEAVY ICBM DEPLOYED BY EITHER PARTY OF THE DATE
OF SIGNATURE OF THIS AGREEMENT.

III

NOW TURNING TO THE SUBJECT OF VERIFICATION, I NOTE THAT THE
AGREEMENT WE HAVE UNDERTAKEN TO PREPARE HERE, BASED UPON THE
UNDERSTANDING REACHED AT VLADIVOSTOK, DIFFERS FROM THE INTERIM
AGREEMENT IN TWO IMPORTANT RESPECTS: FIRST, THE NEW AGREEMENT
WILL BE BROADER IN SCOPE, IN THAT IT PLACES QUANTITATIVE LIMITS
ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS HAVING WIDELY DIFFERING CHARACTER-
ISTICS. THE SYSTEMS WHICH WILL BE COUNTED UNDER THE AGGREGATE
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SECRET

PAGE 03 SALT T 00220 01 OF 02 091613Z

LIMIT WILL INCLUDE, NOT ONLY ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS, BUT ALSO,
FOR THE FIRST TIME, HEAVY BOMBERS AND AIR-TO-SURFACE BALLISTIC
MISSILES OF RANGE GREATER THAN 600 KILOMETERS CARRIED ON BOMBERS
(ASBMS). SECOND, THE NEW AGREEMENT WILL REPRESENT A SIGNIFICANT
STEP IN THE QUALITATIVE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS,
IN THAT THE NUMBER OF LAUNCHERS FOR BALLISTIC MISSILES EQUIPPED
WITH MIRVS WILL BE LIMITED.

THE ABM TREATY AND THE INTERIM AGREEMENT WERE BOTH PREPARED THROUGH OUR JOINT EFFORTS IN SUCH A WAY AS TO PROVIDE ASSURANCES FROM THE OUTSET THAT BOTH GOVERNMENTS, THROUGH THEIR RESPECTIVE NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION, COULD ADEQUATELY VERIFY COMPLIANCE WITH THE AGREED LIMITATIONS. THE NEW AGREEMENT, WITH ITS BROADER SCOPE AND QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS, SHOULD BE FORMULATED SO AS TO ASSURE FROM THE OUTSET THAT IT CAN ALSO BE ADEQUATELY VERIFIED. THIS WILL REQUIRE VERIFYING THE NUMBERS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS OF VARIOUS TYPES WITHIN THE AGGREGATE OF 2400 AND THE NUMBERS OF LAUNCHERS FOR BALLISTIC MISSILES EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS. THESE ARE MORE DIFFICULT AND COMPLEX TASKS THAN VERIFYING THE LIMITATIONS OF EITHER THE INTERIM AGREEMENT OR THE ABM TREATY.

IV

IN PART BECAUSE OF THE GREATER COMPLEXITY WE FORESEE IN VERIFYING COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT, THE US HOLDS THE VIEW THAT THE THIRD PARAGRAPH IN ARTICLE XVII OF THE JOINT DRAFT TEXT IS OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE. WE BELIEVE THAT THE SIDES MUST UNDERTAKE NOT TO USE DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT MEASURES NOR EMPLOY PRACTICES WHICH IMPEDE VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. I WANT TO REITERATE THAT IN THE US VIEW SUCH MEASURES AND PRACTICES INCLUDE, AMONG OTHER THINGS, TEST AND CONSTRUCTION PRACTICES WHICH CONCEAL OR DISGUISE FROM NATIONAL

SECRET

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SECRET

PAGE 01 SALT T 00220 02 OF 02 091627Z

42

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ACDE-00 /026 W

----- 113075

P R 091522Z JUL 75

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TECHNICAL MEANS CAPABILITIES OF BALLISTIC MISSILES, THEIR LAUNCHERS, MOBILE LAUNCH PLATFORMS, OR BOMBERS. THIS AND THE OTHER PROVISIONS SET FORTH IN ARTICLE XVII OF THE JOINT DRAFT TEXT ARE NECESSARY FOR THE VERIFICATION OF BOTH THE 2400 AGGREGATE LIMITATION AND THE MIRV LIMITATION AGREED UPON IN VLADIVOSTOK.

V

WITH REGARD TO VERIFICATION OF THE MIRV LIMITATION, WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT RESOLUTION OF A NUMBER OF PROBLEMS IS ESSENTIAL FOR THE CONCLUSION OF THE NEW AGREEMENT.

THE FIRST PROBLEM IS TO DISTINGUISH, DURING THE TESTING PHASE AND THEREAFTER, BETWEEN TYPES OF MISSILES EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS AND THOSE NOT SO EQUIPPED. THE SECOND IS TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN ICBM LAUNCHERS CONTAINING MIRVED ICBMS AND THOSE CONTAINING UN-MIRVED ICBMS WHEN BOTH KINDS OF PAYLOADS HAVE BEEN TESTED ON THE SAME TYPE OF MISSILE, OR WHEN BOTH MIRVED AND UNMIRVED TYPES OF ICBMS HAVE BEEN TESTED FROM THE SAME TYPE OF LAUNCHER.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 SALT T 00220 02 OF 02 091627Z

THE THIRD IS TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN THOSE SLBM LAUNCHERS OF A GIVEN SUBMARINE CLASS WHICH CONTAIN MISSILES EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS AND THOSE SLBM LAUNCHERS WHICH DO NOT. THE FOURTH PROBLEM IS TO VERIFY WHETHER OR NOT AN ICBM OR SLBM LAUNCHER WHICH HAS NOT CONTAINED A MIRVED MISSILE, BUT WHICH IS THEN MODIFIED, SUBSEQUENTLY CONTAINS A MIRVED MISSILE. FINALLY, ONCE A LAUNCHER CONTAINING A MIRVED MISSILE HAS BEEN CONVERTED TO A LAUNCHER NOT EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS, THERE IS THE PROBLEM OF VERIFYING THAT THE LAUNCHER NO LONGER CONTAINS A MIRVED MISSILE.

THUS, IN SUM, EACH SIDE NEEDS TO BE SATISFIED AS IT ENTERS INTO THE NEW AGREEMENT THAT THROUGHOUT THE LIFE OF THE AGREEMENT IT WILL BE POSSIBLE BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS, ADEQUATELY TO VERIFY THAT THE LIMITATION ON THE NUMBER OF LAUNCHERS EQUIPPED WITH MIRVED MISSILES IS BEING OBSERVED.

VI

IN ORDER FOR THE NEW AGREEMENT TO CONTRIBUTE POSITIVELY TOWARD IMPROVED RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES, WE MUST WORK OUT CLEAR PROVISIONS WHICH WILL ASSURE ADEQUATE VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE AGREEMENT. IF WE DO NOT ACHIEVE THIS

OBJECTIVE, SIGNIFICANT AMBIGUITIES AND UNCERTAINTIES COULD
RESULT AND RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES COULD BE IMPAIRED.
THIS IS WHY IT IS IMPORTANT TO BOTH SIDES THAT THESE PROBLEMS
RECEIVE CAREFUL CONSIDERATION AT THIS TIME.

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: SALT (ARMS CONTROL), ARMS CONTROL MEETINGS, SPEECHES
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 09 JUL 1975
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: GarlanWA
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975SALTT00220
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: X1
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D750236-1050
From: SALT TALKS
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750772/aaaacmpf.tel
Line Count: 231
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: GarlanWA
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 15 JUL 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: WITHDRAWN <16 JUN 2003 by CunninFX, REFER TO DOD/OSD>; RELEASED <15 JUL 2003 by GarlanWA>; APPROVED <15 JUL 2003 by GarlanWA>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
06 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: AMBASSADOR JOHNSON'S STATEMENT OF JULY 9, 1975 (SALT TWO-665)
TAGS: PARM, (JOHNSON)
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006